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1 Introduction 
We analyze how banks choose offer propensity and pricing in response to mortgage applications when 
an online platform, together with hedonic models of collateral appraisal, allows to make offers to clients 
from across the country. Through the platform, each bank can offer also to clients in regions where the 
bank lacks branches, reputation, staff, or local expertise. Unique data on responses from different banks 
in different locations to each applicant allow us to study how the same bank responds to different 
customers, and how the same customer receives responses from different banks. We link bank responses 
to the concentration of each local market and to the extent to which each individual mortgage would 
contribute to each bank’s geographical diversification. 
Our findings on how online pricing of mortgages relates to local competition extends an emerging 
literature on how the internet changes competition (e.g., Cavallo, 2017, and Gorodnichenko and 
Talavera, 2017) to the financial sector. Studying mortgage lending in particular is warranted by the fact 
that a mortgage borrower’s location matters for the lender not only because of inter-regional differences 
in competition, but also because of inter-regional differences in default probabilities and collateral 
values. Once freed from brick and mortar legacies through internet lending, banks’ possibilities for 
geographical diversification are extended beyond those through securitization or bank holding 
companies, both of which the financial crisis showed to be burdened by agency problems.1 
We exploit data from the Swiss platform Comparis.ch, where between 2008 and 2013 households could 
apply for mortgages and received responses from many different banks. Beyond breaking down 
historical legacies of geography, this financial technology or FinTech platform yields data that have two 
major advantages for research. First, we observe both mortgage applications pre-intermediation and 
subsequent lender responses and can hence distinguish demand and supply in a way not possible with 
data on completed contracts. Second, we observe for each application not just the response from one, 
but from several different banks. This allows us to analyze how different banks respond to the same 
                                                     
1 A step in between lending through bank branches and lending through online platforms is of course the use of brokers, as discussed and 
analyzed for the UK in Robles-Garcia (2019). She points out that 33% of mortgage lending in the US (44% before the crisis) and about 50% 
in the UK, Australia and Canada are conducted through brokers. But she shows that brokers may prefer to intermediate those mortgages for 
which they receive the highest bank commissions, whereas the platform analyzed here received money from borrowers only and hence 




borrower and thus break any endogenous matching of different types of borrowers to different types of 
lenders. If we observed only completed contracts, then banks from other cantons (Swiss federal states) 
might have attracted only low-risk (along unobservable dimensions we cannot control for) clients keener 
to contact also lesser-known banks to fully exploit their good credit-worthiness, or they might have 
attracted only high-risk clients who failed to get a good offer at local banks. On the platform by contrast, 
each household gets offers from both local and distant banks so that we can directly compare the offers 
within the same client. Following pioneering work by Khwaja and Mian (2008), this methodology has 
been applied more recently by several papers on bank lending to large firms with more than one bank 
relationship, such as Jimenez et al (2012, 2014). By contrast, it is less common for households to 
maintain active relationships with several different banks, or at least for researchers to observe 
relationships with different banks for the same household. Identification of the quality of Khwaja and 
Mian (2008) has therefore, to our knowledge, been mostly elusive and achieved for lending to 
households only by Basten (2020) using the same data, and by Michelangeli and Sette (2016) who sent 
randomized simulated mortgage applications to different banks. 
To identify the causal effect of each state’s prior market concentration on banks’ online responses, we 
exploit changes in local concentration caused by overseas (US subprime) losses of Switzerland’s big 
two banks UBS and Credit Suisse (CS). As a result of these losses, the two banks had to significantly 
cut domestic mortgage lending, thereby reducing local market concentration more the larger their prior 
market share in each canton. Exploiting prior variation in exposure to exogenous supply shifts, as 
previously done by e.g., Mian and Sufi (2012), Chodorow-Reich (2014) and Gete and Reher (2018), is 
particularly clean in our setup as US losses of UBS and CS are quite exogenous to later online bids of 
small Swiss banks that have no noteworthy US exposure. So the setup satisfies the requirements of 
exogenous shifts for shift-share or Bartik instruments, as recently discussed by Borusyak (2019) and 
Goldsmith-Pinkham et al (forthcoming). Overall, we obtain three salient findings. 
First, we find that on the web banks make more and cheaper offers to applicants from previously more 




off business. Then we might have expected the exact opposite, with banks lowering prices only when 
offering to less concentrated markets. However, offering lower prices instead to more concentrated 
markets allows banks to enter new, more profitable markets given customer switching costs. Households 
thus obtain better offers.2 
Second, going beyond banks’ responses to prior local competition, we find that banks seize the online 
channel in particular to lend more to regions where past unemployment rates as drivers of default 
probabilities and past house price changes as drivers of loss given default have been less correlated with 
those in the bank’s home canton. This allows banks to improve the risk management of their mortgage 
portfolio. Both our findings on competition and those on risk management considerations survive at 
least as strong when in our robustness checks we combine them. Therefore our baseline analyses 
consider both dimensions separately so that we can always use the most conservative set of controls, 
give both topics sufficient attention, and connect to different strands of the literature. 
Our findings on regional diversification contribute to a by now extensive literature that exploits the US 
interstate bank deregulation as evidenced by Goetz et al (2013, 2016) and references therein. While 
Goetz et al (2013) find increases in regional diversification to have reduced average stock market 
valuations of US bank holding companies, Goetz et al (2016) find that it did nonetheless overall reduce 
bank riskiness as measured by the standard deviation (SD) of bank stock returns as well as the Z-score 
and other risk measures. They argue that the hedging of idiosyncratic local risks dominated potential 
reductions in banks’ ability to monitor loans located at a larger distance. While their risk measures cover 
banks’ entire balance sheets, including loans to firms and other assets, we focus on how banks can better 
diversify specifically their mortgage portfolios. Through an online platform like the one studied here, 
lending decisions for different regions can still be made by the same central decision-maker, removing 
the agency problems between bank headquarter and local credit officers traditionally associated with 
larger distance. The online platform analyzed may thus reduce agency costs even beyond the level 
                                                     
2 These findings contribute also to the literature on how distance and technology affect the degree of competition in banking (Petersen and 
Rajan, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Degryse et al, 2009; Eichholtz et al, 2019), showing that the role of distance is modified as bank 




analyzed by Berger and DeYoung (2004), who saw reductions in distance-related agency costs within 
US bank holding companies through improvements in information processing and telecommunication. 
Third, after having estimated how banks’ offer and pricing decisions depend on market concentration, 
portfolio complementarity and other household and bank characteristics, we use a model with 
multiplicative heteroscedasticity (Harvey, 1976) to explore which bank responses are more automated 
around rules and so contain less discretion. We find less discretion for safer applications, as well as by 
larger or more mortgage-focused banks. We also find discretion to decrease with the number of online 
responses a bank has already sent out, allowing to reduce operational costs and use the available hard 
information more efficiently. We so bring together the literature on rules vs discretion in banking (e.g. 
Cerqueiro and Ongena, 2011) with the recent literature on how the internet changes price setting 
(Cavallo, 2017, Gorodnichenko and Talavera, 2017, Gorodnichenko et al, 2018). Gorodnichenko and 
Talavera for example point out that online sales are characterized by lower frictions of price adjustment, 
easier search and price comparisons, and a more limited influence of geographical barriers. They show 
empirically that this leads to more frequent price adjustments. Swiss mortgage prices have low frictions 
of price adjustment also offline, as each client receives an offer customized to his or her particular risk 
characteristics and willingness to pay. But search costs are lowered and geographical barriers removed 
when lending moves to the type of online platform we study. 
More widely, our paper contributes to the emerging literature on how financial technology or “FinTech” 
changes financial intermediation. We refer to the definition by Thakor (2019) who defines FinTech as 
“the use of technology to provide new and improved financial services”.3 Of the four uses of this 
technology listed by Thakor, our paper focuses mostly on the lowering of search costs of matching 
transacting parties. Our setup also fits well with the more recent alternative definition of FinTech by 
Allen et al (2020) as brokerage rather than dealership, i.e. of lending without taking the loans onto the 
own balance sheet. By contrast, Buchak et al (2019) consider only FinTechs simultaneously defined as 
                                                     
3 This is consistent with the definition by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as “technologically enabled financial innovation that 
could result in new business models, applications, processes, or products with an associated material effect on financial markets and 




shadow banks in the sense of non-depository institutions. We focus on activity rather than on who carries 
it out, as the same online platform may be organized by a non-bank as in our case, or may be taken over 
by a bank and yet have much the same effects.4 Finally, Fuster et al (2019) recently emphasize that 
FinTechs can address market frictions. Consistent with this, we show the online platform studied to 
specifically address frictions from geography. It gives borrowers access to more possible lenders, which 
bears some analogies with recent findings in Bartlett et al (2018) on how FinTech has improved access 
to mortgages for minority groups in the US. 
Beyond allowing in particular borrowers from more concentrated local markets to obtain more and better 
offers, and allowing banks to better diversify their portfolio and lower operational costs, mortgage 
contracting through an online platform does of course have the benefit of being possible also during 
pandemics like the recent Covid pandemic, when physical contact is more limited. 
  
                                                     
4 In the years studied Comparis as a non-bank provided an online mortgage platform in Switzerland, while more recently Goldman Sachs as a 
foreign bank became interested in becoming involved, and the Swiss bank UBS also considered organizing such a platform without taking 
all mortgages originated there on its own balance sheet. See https://nzzas.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/goldman-sachs-prueft-einstieg-in-schweizer-





In this section we develop hypotheses on how bank responses vary with respectively prior local market 
concentration and the potential for regional diversification. Following this, we also develop three 
hypotheses on the extent to which lending and pricing decisions are automated. 
2.1 Hypothesis on Local Market Concentration 
Our main interest is in how banks’ online offer behavior responds to how concentrated the mortgage 
market in the applicant’s region has been so far. In the basic oligopolistic version of the well-known 
Monti-Klein model (see e.g. Freixas and Rochet, 2008) banks optimize lending and deposit business 
separately, then lend or borrow any difference between loan and deposit volumes in the interbank 
market. And they do so for a single period only. In such markets, we might expect banks to demand 
higher prices the more concentrated the market they are offering to.  
But more realistically, clients in retail banking buy packages of services from the same bank including 
several components of mortgage loans, mortgage loan refinancing, deposit accounts, transaction 
accounts, or investment advice. This allows banks to “cross-sell” products. One key reason why 
customers do not shop around afresh for each banking service are switching costs. Thus Beggs and 
Klemperer (1992) mention in their pioneering paper on switching costs as one of two examples the effort 
required to close a transactions account with one bank, open one with another, and transfer all 
transactions information. Referring more specifically to lending, Sharpe (1990) as well as Chapter 3.6 
of Freixas and Rochet (2008) point out that lending requires the bank to make some upfront investment 
into screening and monitoring the client. But this has already been made when the loan needs to be 
renewed and may be required even less when the bank has furthermore gained additional information 
about the client during past interactions. As a new lender would still need to pay these costs and typically 
pass them through to the borrower, the existing lender can add a markup for new lending. Sharpe (1990) 




generate expected losses”, expecting that later markup increases make this worthwhile.5 Thus we expect 
that online lending is particularly attractive to banks when it allows them to win a new client in a so far 
more concentrated market where the bank expects more profitable follow-on business. So we posit: 
Hypothesis 1: Banks are more likely to offer, and offer lower prices, the more concentrated the local 
mortgage market has been so far.  
2.2 Hypotheses on Risk Management 
Degryse and Ongena (2005) analyze the role of distance between banks and borrowing firms from a 
competition angle. They find banks to charge higher prices to less distant firms, consistent with similar 
findings by Petersen and Rajan (2000) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010). They interpret this as banks 
exploiting the extra costs to firms from periodically traveling to more distant competitors. To obtain 
these larger margins, a bank may in return need to maintain a larger network of branches. Given these 
findings, we might prima facie expect offered lending margins to decrease in distance also in our setup. 
But the financing of owner-occupied residential property in Switzerland differs from that of firms along 
at least two relevant dimensions. First, residential mortgage borrowers typically do not need to see their 
bank after their mortgage initiation, different from markets like the UK where households may wish to 
take out equity after house price increases, or markets like the US where they want to repay early which 
is practically ruled out in Switzerland through prohibitive pre-payment fees. Second, for mortgage 
lending the distance between bank and borrower matters for bank risk management. While, depending 
on its sector, a firm whose sales area is struggling economically may often have some leeway to sell to 
other markets, real estate is by definition immobile and its value therefore intimately tied to economic 
conditions at its location. So we include analyses on the complementarity of borrower and lender 
location, correlated with distance, under the topic of risk management rather than competition. 
In particular, a bank can reduce risks to its mortgage portfolio by allocating more of its new lending to 
regions where default rates or collateral values are less correlated with those at home. In this vein, Quigly 
                                                     
5 In line with this, Basten and Mariathasan (2018) find that Swiss banks decided to leave deposit rates non-negative even in times of negative 




and Van Order (1991) analyzed how actual mortgage defaults in the US are correlated intra- and inter-
regionally and infer that mortgage portfolios are indeed riskier if they are less regionally diversified. 
On the other hand, a bank’s risk managers may instead prefer to focus lending on fewer regions so that 
it pays to collect more information there. This argument is made by Loutskina and Strahan (2011) and 
empirically confirmed for the US market. Further, Favara and Giannetti (2017) show that a bank with 
many mortgages in the same region can better internalize the negative externalities of collateral 
liquidations on the prices of other nearby collateral in an episode of increased defaults, and likewise 
Giannetti and Saidi (2019) find an internalization of spill-overs from the liquidation of firm loans in 
more concentrated industries. This per se would speak in favor of seeking to sufficiently dominate one 
area in order to internalize and therefore ideally remove that externality. Finally, Agarwal and Hauswald 
(2010) show that banks find it easier to screen firms located closer to them, which is typically where a 
bank has already done most lending in the past. In the same vein, Eichholtz et al (2019) find US banks 
to add margins increasing in distance when pricing mortgages underlying Commercial Mortgage Backed 
Securities. They interpret their measure of distance as a proxy for less soft information. 
To assess whether the benefits of hedging against idiosyncratic local risk or agency problems associated 
with greater distance dominate empirically, Goetz et al (2016) analyze the effects of US interstate 
branching deregulation and find that it does overall reduce bank risk, both when measured as the 
standard deviation of bank stock returns and when measured by Z-scores or other measures. This is so 
despite the fact that Goetz et al (2013) find greater regional diversification to reduce banks’ average 
stock prices. In fact, already Berger and DeYoung (2006) show that technological progress, associated 
in their case with more credit scoring based on more hard rather than soft information as well as with 
more advanced telecommunication technologies, can reduce the agency costs associated with greater 
distance. This confirmed empirically arguments made theoretically by Stein (2000). 
In the segment of residential mortgage lending studied here, regulation restricts the maximum loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio to 90% and the maximum loan-to-income (LTI) ratio to effectively 6, so that none of 




are typically not assessed physically, but through hedonic models bought from one of three consulting 
companies and are based on the same model for all of Switzerland. Finally, all banks have the same hard 
information on each customer and no soft information in the sense relevant e.g. in the setup of Eichholtz 
et al. Therefore the context complies very much with one characterized by Stein (2000) as based fully 
on hard rather than soft information. The only dimension along which a geographically closer bank 
might reach a different assessment on the basis of the same information is that it may attach a more or 
less positive value to the applicant’s postcode area than a bank with less local knowledge. So we expect 
the diversification motif to dominate and posit: 
Hypothesis 2: Banks are more likely to offer, and offer lower prices, when unemployment rates as 
proxies for default probabilities, or house prices as collateral values, have historically exhibited a lower 
correlation between the applicant’s and the bank’s canton. 
2.3 Hypotheses on Automation 
Any of the determinants of mortgage pricing discussed above can be effective by automating rules 
through a computer or by communicating common policies for staff to follow. Alternatively, if staff 
retain sufficient leeway they may take into account also other factors. In the context studied, we dispose 
of all hard information the bank received through the platform and would therefore expect less 
heterogeneity in offers than in contexts in which loan officers may dispose of additional soft information. 
Yet we do expect more scrutiny for riskier applications as well as by banks who have less (offline) 
experience in the mortgage market because they are smaller or less focused on the mortgage business. 
More interestingly in the context studied, we expect that banks can increasingly automate their business 
the more experience they have already accumulated with lending through the platform. So we posit: 
Hypothesis 3: We expect more discretion for responses (a) to riskier applications, (b) from smaller or 




3 Data and Institutional Background 
3.1 Data Sources 
The key data used for our investigation stem from the Swiss website Comparis.ch. Between 2008 and 
2013, they operated a platform on which households could apply for mortgages and were then provided 
responses from several different banks. For reasons of data quality, we focus on 2010-13. The resulting 
data are unique and offer at least five advantages for our analysis. First, we separately observe demand 
and supply. Second, banks in their operation and we in analyzing them can rule out differential access 
to clients from different regions based on amongst others pre-existing branch networks. Third, we can 
rule out that different banks tend to interact with different types of clients. Fourth, we observe 100% of 
the information each bank also has on each client. Bank decisions cannot be biased by the use of soft 
information acquired through prior personal interaction. Furthermore, as banks do not learn applicants’ 
names, they must rely on the information we fully observe and cannot complement it e.g. with external 
credit scores. Fifth, in contrast to many brokers who earn differential fees from different lenders (Robles-
Garcia, 2019), the platform analyzed was paid by borrowers only. 
Observations on how different banks respond to the same client have to the best of our knowledge until 
recently been achieved only in research on lending to corporates, such as Jimenez et al (2012, 2014). By 
contrast, households engaged in mortgage borrowing have not been observed to interact with several 
different banks. Yet Jordà et al (2016) and other papers have shown forcefully the importance of the key 
role of mortgage markets in causing banking, financial and general economic crises, given that 
mortgages tend to be the largest financial liability of most households as well as the largest class of 
assets for many banks. And endogenous matching is likely to matter also for our questions of interest, 
because offline the type of households willing to contract with distant banks is likely to differ from the 
type who stay with local banks only. To our knowledge the first paper to observe how different banks 
respond to the same mortgage borrower is Basten (2020) who uses the same Comparis data as we do 




For the present purpose, the data include two outcomes of interest. First, an indicator of whether a 
specific bank makes an offer to a specific client. Second, given that it does, the rate offered. Offers can 
consist of between 1 and 3 tranches of different amounts, which may differ in the rate fixation period as 
well as in the offered interest rate. For each tranche, we subtract from the offered mortgage rate the swap 
rate for the same fixation period applicable on the day of the offer, as available through Bloomberg. 
This is to reflect the bank’s refinancing costs absent any maturity transformation and is the measure of 
refinancing costs commonly used in the market under study, see also Basten (2020) and Basten and 
Mariathasan (2018). Finally, we compute the weighted average across the up to three tranches, with 
weights given by the fractions of the total mortgage amount attributable to the respective tranche.6 Prices 
offered here are indeed a key dimension along which banks can influence how many mortgage contracts 
they conclude each period. Thus Basten (2020) shows, using the same data, how banks more affected 
by higher capital requirements increase offered mortgage rates more and thereafter end up with lower 
growth rates in their mortgage volumes. Important to emphasize when we analyse how offers are related 
to amongst others local market concentration is the fact that in Switzerland banks can and do offer 
customer-specific rates rather than offering practically the same rate to every customer with the same 
fixation period and LTV, as reported for the UK market in Robles-Garcia (2019). 
As we know each bank’s name, we complement the Comparis data with data from banks’ annual reports 
on their total assets, mortgages over total assets, deposits over total assets, and capitalization. We also 
add data on actual house price growth by region from Fahrländer Partner Real Estate (FPRE). Together 
with Wüest & Partner and IAZI, FPRE is the leading Swiss real estate consulting company who, amongst 
other services, provides hedonic models that allow banks to gauge whether the market price a mortgage 
borrower wishes to pay is deemed appropriate. On the basis of the same hedonic quality adjustments 
they also compute house price indices for different quality segments from which we compute year-on-
                                                     
6 As the majority of offers consist of only 1 tranche, and as offers with several tranches have the majority of the amount offered in the 1st 




year house price growth rates. Finally, to construct our instrument we use data on the two big banks’ 
shares in cantonal markets, which can be computed from data on the SNB website.7 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Overall we start with 6’914 applications, which attract a total of 25’125 responses. 20’583 of these are 
offers and 4’542 rejections. Table 1 shows the corresponding Summary Statistics. To provide a picture 
that corresponds as closely as possible to the data used for the subsequent regressions, the summary 
statistics use the same number of observations as the regressions. Thus Panel (A), which focuses on the 
key characteristics of the mortgage applications, assigns more weight to applications that received more 
responses. The number of responses varies between 1 (in 1.53% of cases) and 10 (in 0.04% of cases). 
Most applications received between 3 and 6 responses, the average application about 4 responses. The 
mortgage amount applied for, and which by design could not be adjusted by the responding banks, varied 
between CHF 100’000 and CHF 2’000’000, with an average value of a bit under 600’000. The LTV 
ratio varied between 15% and 90%, with an average value of about 65%. Here the maximum is shaped 
by the fact that for any mortgage violating the self-regulatory requirement of at least 10% of “hard 
equity” from the household, the bank willing to provide it would have faced a regulatory risk weight of 
100% instead of on average about 40%. The Loan-to-Income (LTI) ratio varied between 0.69 and 9.62, 
with a mean of  3.59. Household income varied between CHF 48’000 and 600’000, with a mean close 
to CHF 170’000, wealth including pension fund wealth reached an average close to CHF 500’000, and 
average age was 46 years. 
Next, Panel (B) gives the key regional characteristics. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) of 
market concentration for new mortgage lending ranges across the 26 cantons between 0.12 and 0.49, 
with a mean of 0.18 and a standard deviation (SD) of 0.05. The multi-market contact (competition) 
measure (MMC) of how many competitors in a canton a bank meets on average in how many other 
cantons ranges between 0.05 and 0.40 with an average of 0.07, while the number of online providers 
                                                     




varies across cantons between 4 and 14, with an average close to 11. Finally, we see that house price 
growth rates vary between -4% and +15% with an average around 4%, while the share of foreigners 
varies between about 10 and 40%, with an average of about 21%.  
Looking at bank characteristics in Panel (C), where banks are again weighted by the number of 
responses sent out, total assets (TA) range between CHF 434 million and CHF 37.8 billion, with an 
average of 16.9 billion. Between about 40% and 91% of these, and on average 70% of them are invested 
in mortgages, which reflects the general focus of Swiss retail banks on mortgage lending, see also Basten 
and Mariathasan (2018). On the liability side, the most important position for most banks are deposits, 
with a range between about 17% and 66% and an average size of 48%. The capital ratio ranged between 
4.72% and 11.33% and averaged 7.25% of total assets. 
Panel (D) finally gives the key characteristics of bank-household interactions. First, when sending out 
each response, banks could draw on experience with between 0 and about 10’000 prior responses, with 
an average of about 4’000 as not all banks ever reach the 10’000 during our sample period. Relevant for 
portfolio diversification, the inter-cantonal correlation of unemployment rates was on average 92%, but 
goes as low as 66% and has a high standard deviation of about 68%, suggesting that there is still potential 
to lower correlations in the portfolio overall. The inter-cantonal correlation of house price changes 
achieves a mean of 77% with a SD of 19%, but goes as low as 15%. This reflects the fact that while real 
estate markets in all cantons are affected by the same interest rate, net immigration differs considerably 
due to different languages and therefore different source country compositions, as does regional 
economic specialization. Further, responses take about 97 hours or about 4 days, although a bit over half 
of all responses arrive already within 48 hours. About 82% of all responses are offers. The rate fixation 
period (FP) ranges between 0.25 years, for mortgages where the rate adjusts to the CHF Libor interbank 
rate every 3 months, and 10 years. The average of 7.4 years reflects that 10 years is the most common 
FP. The average rate offered amounts to 2.16%, which implies an average spread above the swap rate 
for the same period of 90 basis points (bps). Yet the spread varies between 40 and 152 bps, so banks’ 




4 Empirical Strategy 
We organize our analyses around the areas covered in our hypothesis section above: market 
concentration, risk management, and automation. After explaining how we tackle each of these three 
areas, we discuss how we combine non-linear estimators with both instrumental-variable methods and 
a large set of fixed effects, as well as how we cluster standard errors. 
4.1 Strategy on Local Market Concentration 
Our key measure of the concentration of cantonal mortgage markets is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
(HHI), i.e. the sum of squared mortgage market shares, in cantonal mortgage volumes.8 One issue is that 
when analyzing the effect of prior market concentration in the applicant’s canton, we can — other than 
in the analyses on inter-cantonal unemployment and house price correlations discussed below — not 
exploit variation within literally the same applicant. It is then possible that different banks’ prior 
presence as well as current online offer behavior are influenced by the same unobservable. In that case, 
any estimates of more or better offers to previously more concentrated cantonal markets constitute only 
a lower bound on banks’ true eagerness to enter those markets, for they might be even more eager to 
lend there keeping fixed unobserved disadvantages of that region which might have reduced banks’ prior 
offline presence and thereby led to a more concentrated market. 
To address this concern, we exploit the fact that precisely during the years of interest most Swiss 
cantonal mortgage market concentrations fell, after the “big two” banks UBS and Credit Suisse (CS) 
had experienced drastic losses in the US market and suffered hefty subsequent deposit withdrawals by 
their Swiss customers. As a consequence, their Switzerland-wide mortgage portfolios ended up growing 
only about half as fast as that of the market as a whole. This opened up opportunities for other banks 
and it did so more the larger the initial market share held by the big two banks. We instrument the actual 
HHI in each year and canton by that predicted by this exogenous change only. In particular, we compute 
                                                     
8 Not only do we not have all data for regions more granular than the 26 cantons, but cantons are also considered separate but entire markets 
by Swiss practitioners. This is so because in particular many cantonal banks have mandates restricting which cantons (often their home plus 




the predicted HHI as the 2009 level plus the Switzerland-wide changes, and weight these changes by 
the big two banks’ 2009 market shares. 
This strategy to exploit pre-existing variation in market shares to obtain differential exposure to a 
supply-side shock is similar to strategies recently used by Mian and Sufi (2012), Chodorow-Reich 
(2014), d’Acunto & Rossi (2017), and Gete and Reher (2018). Chodorow-Reich in particular discusses 
also how Credit Suisse was hit hard by losses in the US mortgage backed securities market and therefore 
had to reduce amongst others its US syndicated lending. In contrast to those papers which focus on 
effects of losses or higher costs in the US on some segment of US lending argued to be sufficiently 
exogenous, we exploit the fact that following their losses in the US the Swiss Big Two had to cut also 
their lending at home, which reduced market concentration in particular in those cantons (states) where 
the two had the largest market shares before.  
The episode and its exogeneity to Swiss mortgage markets is discussed in more detail in Blickle (2018) 
and Brown et al (2019). Brown et al analyze which types of households were how quick to withdraw 
deposits from the big banks. Blickle exploits that where the Raiffeisen network of cooperative banks 
had branches close to UBS branches significant portions of the deposit outflows from UBS went to 
Raiffeisen and enabled it to increase their mortgage lending. Here we go one step back and focus on the 
fact that, while selected Raiffeisen banks could lend more following the deposit inflows, UBS and CS 
had to lend less following their deposit outflows. While the opportunities of the two big banks to borrow 
without collateral from banks without overseas losses or deposit withdrawals were limited, the Swiss 
National Bank (SNB) orchestrated an opportunity for them to issue additional covered bonds and so 
borrow against collateral through the so-called “Limmat transactions” in 2008 and 2009.9 This reduced 
their liquidity shortages and the size of the necessary recapitalizations in 2008, in the case of UBS 
provided through a government bail-out.10 Yet given capital constraints new lending was not a priority, 
especially for mortgages where the relationship component was arguably less important. 
                                                     
9 For more details, see https://www.fuw.ch/article/der-stille-retter-der-grossbanken/ , accessed on October 23, 2019. 




Relevant for our purposes is the fact that the same reduction in UBS’ and CS’ mortgage lending had, in 
the style of Bartik instruments, a relatively larger impact on competition intensity in cantons in which 
these two big banks had previously been serving a larger share of the market. First, clients seeking to 
refinance a mortgage typically ask first for refinancing conditions with their existing lender. Second, 
also new clients will be more likely to inquire with those banks from whom many of their neighbors 
have borrowed in recent years, and which have more branches in the area. When these two banks then 
rejected more applications or offered only unattractive prices, this opened up opportunities for 
competitors with previously smaller market shares and so reduced the HHI of market concentration. 
As pointed out recently in the economics literature by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al (forthcoming) and 
Borusyak et al (2019), the validity of a Bartik or shift-share instrument requires that either shares or 
shifts or both are uncorrelated with the outcomes of interest through channels other than the 
instrumented variable. In our setup it is not clear that this exclusion restriction would hold for the shares, 
for we cannot exclude the presence of some unobservable which affects both the big two banks’ prior 
market shares and other banks’ current online bidding behavior. However, the shift caused by the big 
two banks’ losses in the US market is plausibly not otherwise related to smaller Swiss banks’ differential 
online bidding. Our baseline regression can be summarized as follows: 
𝑌ℎ,𝑏 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝐻𝐻𝐼ℎ) + 𝛿𝑋ℎ + 𝜇𝑋𝑏 + 𝜏(𝑌𝑀𝐹𝐸ℎ) + ℎ,𝑏      (1) 
Here subscript h denotes the household and subscript b the bank. Baseline regressions for the binary 
outcome Offerh,b are estimated by Probit, those for the continuous outcome Pricingh,b by linear 
regression. In both cases, we instrument HHIh with changes in cantonal competition intensity induced 
by the Big Two overseas losses as explained above. We start with both bank and household controls, 
then replace bank controls Xb with bank fixed effects, and finally also replace household characteristics 
Xh with household group fixed effects. Groups capture every household characteristic except for the 
canton of residence, which would be collinear with the HHI regressor of interest. In variants one and 
two with household controls, we additionally control for year*month fixed effects. In the third variant 




4.2 Strategy on Risk Management 
As we do not directly observe inter-cantonal correlations between actual mortgage market losses, we 
use instead correlations between unemployment rates as drivers of probabilities of default, and in year-
on-year changes in house prices as key determinants of loss given default. The use of house price change 
correlations has the benefit of taking into account not only house price collapses in the last crisis in the 
early 1990s but also house price growth since then, which banks may consider to paint a more up-to-
date picture. These past correlations are based on year-on-year growth rates in a house price index for 
medium-quality apartment prices since 1985 from FPRE consultants, but growth rates on low or high 
quality apartments or single-family homes yield very similar regression results. These correlations are 
all positive: Within a country as small as Switzerland subject to the same monetary policy it is hard to 
find a region whose house prices can be expected to increase when those elsewhere decrease. Yet 
despite a common monetary policy, summary statistics show that as different cantons specialize in 
different economic sectors and receive the majority of net immigrants from different countries, some 
inter-cantonal correlations are as low as 0.15, which does allow for diversification. We can thus 
summarize our analyses of banks’ responses to geographical complementarity as follows: 
𝑌ℎ,𝑏 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ,𝑏)+𝛿𝑋ℎ + 𝜇𝑋𝑏 + 𝜏(𝑌𝑀𝐹𝐸ℎ) + ℎ,𝑏     (2) 
In general this follows the specifications in Equation 1 on market concentration, except that the primary 
regressor of interest is now our measure of portfolio complementarity instead of the HHI competition 
measure. As complementarity varies both within households and within banks, we can now use fixed 
effects for each household rather than just for each household group. Therefore we do now not need to 
find a suitable instrument for the complementarity regressor. 
4.3 Strategy on Automation 
To formalize our ideas on automation vs. discretion, we build on the model of multiplicative 
heteroscedasticity formulated by Harvey (1976) and used in a bank lending context by amongst others 




smaller and more opaque firms. This can be rationalized by the idea that decisions in these cases are 
harder to automate well. So they are more likely to be escalated to (senior) staff. In our context, all loans 
are mortgages and collateralized. But we expect more discretion in response to riskier applications. 
In a first step we estimate the “mean equation”, relating the outcomes of interest offer and spread to 
determinants of interest. Following that, we compute for each response from bank b to household h the 
squared residual uhb2 as a measure of variation in the outcomes of interest not explained by the mean 
equation, which we call “Discretion”. In step two, the “variance equation” then relates the log of this 
discretion measure on regressors of interest: 
ln(𝑢ℎ,𝑏
2 ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋ℎ + 𝛾𝑋𝑏 + 𝛿(𝐻𝐻𝐼ℎ) + 𝜃(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦ℎ,𝑏) + 𝜇(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒ℎ,𝑏) + ℎ,𝑏 (3) 
These include again all household characteristics Xh, all bank characteristics Xb, market concentration in 
the applicant’s canton HHIh and Complementarityh,b between household h’s and bank b’s canton. In 
addition, we now include Experienceh,b, measured by the number of responses bank b has already sent 
out when responding to household h. As before we start by including all bank and household 
characteristics as expressed in Equation 3. In subsequent variations, we first replace bank chacteristics 
with bank fixed effects and then replace also household controls with household group fixed effects. 
While econometrically mean and variance equation may contain different sets of regressors, so that 
existing papers denote regressors in stage 2 by Z instead of X, we use the same sets in both stages.11 
4.4 Nonlinear Estimation with Endogenous Regressors and Fixed Effects 
To probe the robustness of our results, our tables on competition and risk management start out in 
columns 1 and 2 with both bank and household controls, replace in columns 3 and 4 bank controls with 
bank fixed effects, and replace in columns 5 and 6 also household controls with household (group) fixed 
effects. While columns 2, 4 and 6 use as outcome of interest the continuous variable pricing and can 
thus be estimated linearly, columns 1, 3 and 5 use the binary outcome Offer, which calls for a non-linear 
                                                     




probit or logit estimator. The probit estimator we use in columns 1 and 3 can be combined with bank 
fixed effects without running into the incidental parameter problem, as we have merely 26 different 
banks and on average more than 4’200 observations per bank. By contrast, in Column 5 which includes 
fixed effects for each household (group), we would have too few observations per cross-sectional unit 
so that a probit estimator would not be consistent. Therefore column 6 always uses instead a logit 
estimator, which following Abrevaya (1997) can be implemented as conditional Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator and thereby circumvent the incidental parameter problem.  
The move from probit to logit in column 6 in turn means that implementing the instrumental variable 
(IV) method through predictor substitution, i.e. by replacing in stage 2 the endogenous regressor with 
its predictor obtained in the first stage, is inconsistent. Following Terza et al (2008) however, a 
consistent estimator can still be obtained by implementing the IV method through residual inclusion. 
Here stage 2 does include the endogenous regressor itself, rather than its predictor, but it controls in 
stage 2 for the residuals from stage 1. 
Following Bertrand et al (2014), at the baseline we cluster our standard errors by the panel dimension 
of columns 5 and 6 of each table, i.e. by the 708 household groups for our market concentration analyses 
and by the 6’914 households for our risk management analyses. Robustness checks available on request, 
which cluster instead by the 7’442 bank * household zip code combinations, or by the 173 bank * 
household canton combinations, yield qualitatively the same results. All of these options have more than 
50 clusters as recommended by Cameron and Miller (2015) and none of them contains more than 5% of 
observations, as recommended by Rogers (1993), both guidelines of which would be violated if 






Table 2 and Table 3 present our baseline results on market concentration, Table 4 focuses on risk 
management through geographical diversification, and Table 5 looks at automation. In addition, a wide 
range of robustness check tables is available in the Online Appendix, but also briefly discussed below. 
To facilitate comparison, all tables follow a similar structure, analyzing in columns with unequal 
numbers whether each of the 25’125 bank responses constitutes an offer or a rejection, and in columns 
with equal numbers the spread above maturity-congruent refinancing costs offered on the 20’583 offers. 
Results on offer propensities are robust to using logit or a linear probability model (LPM) instead of 
probit regressions. Furthermore, columns 1-2 always start out with both household and bank controls, 
columns 3-4 replace bank controls with bank fixed effects, and columns 5-6 replace also household 
controls with household fixed effects in analyses on risk management, while the analyses on responses 
to market concentration use instead fixed effects for household groups which consist of all 
characteristics except for geography to avoid collinearity with canton-varying market concentration. The 
tables show the regressors of specific interest in those tables at the top, followed first by key household 
characteristics and then by key bank characteristics. 
 
Before discussing more deeply banks’ responses to market concentration and portfolio complementarity, 
we start by briefly discussing their responses to households’ and banks’ own characteristics, which are 
shared by all tables and help to better understand the setup. For household characteristics we focus on 
indicators for LTV ratios above 67% and 80% and loan-to-income (LTI) ratios above 4.5 and 5.5 
respectively. The specific threshold values reflect frequent practice in the market12 and for LTV ratios 
are identical to those thresholds above which Swiss banks following the Basel Standardized Approach 
(all banks in our sample) face higher risk weights leading to higher capital requirements and therefore 
higher refinancing costs (see Basten 2020). The threshold indicators turn out to have stronger effects on 
                                                     
12 In particular, banks deem applicants more risky if their Payment-to-Income (PTI) ratio exceeds 1/3. For computing the PTI ratio during the 
period analyzed, banks used «stress-test» interest rates of either 4.5% or 5%. In addition they assumed house maintenance costs amounting 
to either 1% of the loan value, or 1% of the house value, implying 1.5% of the loan value at an LTV ratio of 2/3. Finally, amortization was 
assumed to be either 1% of the loan value, or 0% when regulation did not require it due to an initial LTV ratio below two-thirds, or before 
June 2012. Overall the 9 resulting combinations implied annual mortgage service payments ranging between 5.5% and 7.65% of the loan. 
The requirement for this to not exceed 1/3 was then equivalent to LTI thresholds of between 4.36 and 6.06. Here we round these to 4.5 and 




the outcomes of interest than continuous LTV or LTI variables. In robustness checks available on 
request, continuous LTV and LTI ratios fail to have a statistically significant effect on our outcomes of 
interest after controlling for the indicators displayed here. Furthermore, in line with common practice at 
the banks studied, we focus on the two risk characteristics LTV and LTI. When we additionally control 
for a household’s total income, rental income or non-labor income, for the household’s wealth (including 
pension fund wealth), debt, age or the type of dwelling sought, which are also observed in addition to 
LTV and LTI, none of them changes significantly the coefficients displayed.  
 
As one would expect, we find throughout that higher LTV or LTI ratios induce banks to offer less often 
and, conditional on still offering, to add a risk premium and therefore charge higher prices. This is in 
line with, amongst others, Campbell and Cocco (2015), who point out how higher LTV ratios tend to be 
associated with higher credit risk in mortgage lending. The about 50% of applications asking for banks 
to finance a new real estate purchase rather than to refinance an older mortgage, tend to receive more 
offers, in line with the fact that such clients can be expected to yield business for longer. At the same 
time, they are offered higher rates, even after controlling for the now on average lower LTV and LTI 
ratios, which may reflect that first-time buyers have not yet been screened by another bank and have not 
yet proven their ability and willingness to keep servicing their mortgage. 
When we focus instead on bank characteristics, we see that banks which are either larger in terms of 
total assets or have a larger fraction of their assets dedicated to mortgage lending offer more often and 
at more competitive prices. One plausible explanation of this finding, beyond risk management, is a 
higher operational efficiency. By contrast, banks that raise a larger fraction of their funding through 
deposits offer less often. Here one possible reason is that having more depositors provides a bank already 
with a larger pool of potential mortgage clients, so that it depends less on selling mortgages also through 
the online channel. Another is that in contrast to the second most important source of funding for Swiss 
commercial banks, covered bonds, deposits have shorter contractually guaranteed rate fixation periods. 
Thus financing mortgages – the majority of which carries fixed rates – with deposits tends to yield a 




Finally, banks that are better capitalized tend to charge higher prices, possibly reflecting the fact that a 
larger fraction of funding raised through equity is typically thought to imply (more safety in crisis times 
but also) higher marginal costs per unit of lending. After this general discussion on the effects of our 
control variables, demonstrating the validity of our setup, we now turn to our key regressors of interest. 
5.1 Results on Local Market Concentration 
Table 2 looks at banks’ responses to local market concentration in the canton of the applying household. 
Our key regressor of interest here is the HHI, which is defined to range between 0 in the case of perfect 
competition and 1 in the case of a pure monopoly. Summary statistics in Table 1 reveal that in the 26 
cantons studied it ranges between 0.12 and 0.49, reflecting the heterogeneity of cantonal markets, and 
amounts to 0.18 on average.13 Read literally, coefficients in Table 2 address the effects of offering to a 
so far fully monopolized market (HHI = 1) rather than a fully competitive market (HHI = 0). In 
particular, below the constant we display in columns 1, 3 and 5 the average (across all observed HHI 
values) marginal effects implied by our probit and logit coefficients. They show that a bank would be 
18-35% more likely to make an offer to a fully monopolized market and in addition be willing to 
discount the price by 50-57 bps. More realistically, the 0.10 HHI difference between low and high 
concentration by the definition of the US Department of Justice would increase the offer probability by 
1.8-3.5% and in addition lower the price by 5-5.7bps. 
Table 3 explores further the plausibility of our interpretation whereby banks make more and cheaper 
offers to cantons with higher market concentration with the motivation to land more lucrative follow-on 
business there. In this vein, we added interactions of the HHI with respectively an indicator of whether 
the household’s age exceeds the 25th percentile of 38 years, with an indicator for whether the applicant 
asks to finance a new purchase, with the share of foreigners in the applicant’s canton in 2010, and with 
an indicator for whether the amount asked for exceeds the 90th percentile or CHF 1 million. The 
reasoning behind these tests is that ceteris paribus a bank can expect more lucrative follow-on business 
                                                     
13 By way of comparison, the US Department of Justice (DoJ) classifies markets with HHI below 0.15 as having a low and markets with HHI 




from younger households, new mortgage borrowers, foreigners new to the country, or borrowers of 
larger sums. Each of the interactions is instrumented with the interaction of the respective household 
characteristic with the instrument for HHI, which is valid under the assumption that the respective 
household characteristics are exogenous to current bank offer behavior. 
To start with, while the main effect of age tells us that a household aged below 38 pays on average 4 
basis points extra given larger uncertainty about credit-worthiness, the HHI discount increases from 36 
bps (42 with all fixed effects) to 54 (60 with all fixed effects). This plausibly reflects that a younger 
household is likely to bring in more new business not already at other banks. Similarly, while per se new 
mortgage clients are charged about 7bps extra to account for their shorter repayment history, the HHI 
discount is up to 24bps larger for them, consistent with the fact that winning a new client over once does 
also increase the bank’s chances to provide later refinancing. By contrast, the share of foreigners in the 
applicant’s canton has no significant effect, which may reflect simply that the share of foreigners per 
canton is a rather crude proxy for whether or not the household itself is new to the country and which 
neither we nor the banks can observe. Finally, we observe a discount of between 17 and 24 bps for 
mortgages of at least CHF 1 million, but with our clustering that effect is statistically significant only at 
the 10% significance level, and only in one of our three specifications. Relatedly, for all interaction 
terms we observe no statistically significant effects on offer propensities, but only on pricing. But the 
effects of the interactions between HHI and the dummies for respectively young households and first-
time buyers on pricing are consistent with banks exploiting the platform to start new business in 
particular with expectedly more lucrative new clients. 
Looking at Table AT1 and Table AT2 in the Online Appendix, where the impact of big banks’ retraction 
is translated to cantons on the grounds of their previous deposit rather than mortgage market shares, we 
find overall qualitatively very similar results, which is not surprising as 2009 big two shares based on 
deposit volumes (Table AT1) or deposit account numbers (Table AT2) are 90% (86%) correlated with 
shares based on mortgage volumes. Correspondingly, Table AT3 there shows that, across all three 




with the shift-share instrument yield coefficients between 0.85 and 0.88 when using bank and household 
controls or bank fixed effects and household controls, and between 0.96 and 0.97 when using both bank 
and household group fixed effects.  
When, for comparison, Table AT4 uses basic OLS rather than IV regressions, the average marginal 
effect on offer propensities, displayed at the bottom, shrinks from 18 to 13, 28 to 14, and 35 to 28% in 
the three specifications respectively, and remains statistically significant only in the versions with fixed 
effects rather than household and bank controls. Likewise the effect on pricing in the three specifications 
shrinks from 54 to 34, from 57 to 44 and from 50 to 49bps respectively. This confirms our argument 
above that absent exogenous variation in prior market concentration effects tend to be downward biased. 
Our IV strategy solves this and finds true effects to be larger. 
In contrast to our IV regressions, which cannot instrument both HHI and another measure of market 
concentration, Table AT4 includes also the measure of Multi-Market Contact (Competition). It finds 
that if anything banks tend to offer more often (column 3) and at lower prices (columns 2 and 4) if they 
encounter in a market more competitors whom they meet also in other cantons. This is more consistent 
with the findings in Park and Penacchi (2008) whereby multi-market contact promotes more competitive 
behavior than with the earlier idea of Edwards (1955) of a “linked oligopoly”. 
Last, we foreshadow here that the results on banks’ responses to prior market concentration are overall 
equally clear and for pricing even stronger when in Table A6 in the Online Appendix we analyze them 
simultaneously with those to risk management incentives, as discussed in more detail below. 
5.2 Results on Risk Management 
Table 4 analyzes how banks’ responses relate to the complementarity of unemployment rates in the 
applicant’s canton with that in the bank’s home canton, which typically makes up the majority of 
mortgages already on the bank’s balance sheet. The complementarity is simply the inverse of the 




unemployment as the key systemic driver of defaults14 in the applicant’s canton increases less when 
those in the bank’s home canton increase. As in Table 2 and 3, columns 1, 3 and 5 for the binary outcome 
offer display first the probit (logit) coefficients for all regressors, and below the constant we then display 
the associated average (across all observed values of complementarity) marginal effects. These tell us 
that a bank would be up to 1.92% more likely to extend an offer, and in addition would be willing to 
lower the price by up to 1.98 basis points, to a household from a canton where the unemployment 
correlation with the bank’s home canton is one standard deviation or 0.66 units lower.  
In the Online Appendix, Table AT5 replaces the complementarity measure based on unemployment 
rates with a measure based on house price growth, based on the consideration that larger house price 
decreases in crises imply higher loss given default (LGD). Here we find that a change in 
complementarity by one standard deviation or 0.19 units increases the offer propensity by up to 1.14% 
and lowers the price by up to 1.14 basis points. These responses are somewhat smaller than those to 
unemployment rate complementarity, which makes sense insofar as ideally the bank wants to keep the 
probabilities of default in its entire portfolio low. Use of remaining collateral values in a foreclosure 
procedure becomes necessary only conditional on default and in addition will at least imply additional 
costs even when the collateral value does still exceed the remaining debt. 
Focusing on the price response to more unemployment complementariy, a discount of 2 bps may seem 
little at first sight, but this is after fully controlling for all observable and unobservable bank and 
household characteristics. Since online offers from different banks should really differ only across the 
pricing dimension, a household who paid about CHF 100 to obtain different offers seems likely to pick 
the cheapest offer only. Thus Basten (2020) has shown with data from the same platform that banks who 
increased mortgage prices relatively more after an increase in capital requirements did then experience 
relatively slower mortgage growth, confirming that households do respond to price changes in this setup. 
                                                     
14 Another important determinant of default, following conversation with practitioners, is divorce, but divorces are so far not known to exhibit 




Finally, Table A6 in the Online Appendix combines our baseline analyses on banks’ responses to market 
concentration from Table 2 with the baseline analyses on risk management incentives from Table 4. In 
contrast to Table 4 and in line with Table 2, columns 5 and 6 can control for household group fixed 
effects but cannot use fixed effects for every single household due to collinearity with the only inter-
cantonal variation in HHI. This is one of the reasons why our baseline analyses investigate competition 
and risk management considerations separately. But overall Table A6 strongly confirms our findings on 
bank responses to both HHI and risk management considerations and hence shows that both findings 
exist on their own and neither is simply driven by the other. So we decided to treat the two topics 
separately in our baseline, allowing us to use for each the most conservative specification possible as 
well as to speak to several distinct strands of the literature.  
5.3 Results on Automation 
Table 5 follows largely the same outline as Table 2 in that columns 1, 3 and 5 focus on the offer and 
columns 2, 4 and 6 on the pricing decision. Also in line with Table 2, columns 1-2 use bank and 
household controls, 3-4 replace bank controls with bank fixed effects, and columns 5-6 also replace 
household controls with household group fixed effects. Like in Table 2, we use fixed effects for each 
household group defined by all characteristics except location so that we can still estimate the effect of 
local market concentration. Unlike in Table 2, we do not instrument market concentration here.  
More importantly, the outcome for which we display coefficients here is not offer or pricing itself, but 
the log of the squared residual not explained by the estimated bank rules. Starting with household 
characteristics, we find that offer decisions have a 62-70% larger squared residual and hence a 7.9-8.3% 
larger residual, which we call discretion, when the LTV ratio exceeds 80%. Likewise, we observe 4.6-
4.9% more discretion when the LTI ratio exceeds 4.5, and another 7.5-7.9% when it exceeds 5.5. In 
addition, pricing decisions contain 6.2-7.3% more discretion already when the LTV ratio exceeds two-
thirds. These findings clearly support our Hypothesis 3a whereby decisions on riskier clients tend to be 




extent left to automated choice. This is consistent with the predictions in Petersen and Rajan (1995) 
whereby banks exert more discretion when lending to more “opaque” and hence harder-to-value firms. 
Relatedly, we find 2.2-3.9% less discretion in decisions for each percent by which the bank has a larger 
balance sheet. We also find 1.4-1.7% less discretion for each percentage point of total assets previously 
invested in mortgages. These two findings confirm our Hypothesis 3b whereby banks with more prior 
mortgage expertise can automate their decision-making to a larger extent. Further, we find less discretion 
in decisions about applications from more concentrated and more complementary markets. These two 
findings are in line with those discussed above whereby banks are particularly eager to lend to those 
markets, and this preference may dominate other considerations sufficiently often that banks decide in 
a more automated fashion and hence more quickly in these cases. 
Finally, we observe 1.4-2.8% less discretion in offer choices for each 1’000 responses made before. 
Interestingly we cannot confirm that this experience allows banks also to automate their pricing more, 
but we consider the greater automation of offer decisions as confirming Hypothesis 3c above. Table A7 
in the Online Appendix displays the underlying mean equation estimates. They correspond largely to 
those already discussed above with more and cheaper offers for safer clients, as well as from larger or 
more mortgage-focused banks, to more concentrated markets, and to markets more complementary to 
banks’ existing portfolios. They also suggest that offer propensity increases in bank experience, although 
only by 1% per 1’000 previous responses and the effect on pricing is not robust across specifications. 
Increasing automation can allow banks to cut operational costs. Admittedly we cannot explicitly observe 
whether greater automation comes at the cost of more wrong decisions. But the fact that in the setup 
studied banks dispose of high-quality hard but no soft information suggests to us that decision quality 




6 Conclusion  
In this paper we have investigated how mortgage lending changes through a FinTech online platform 
where potential borrowers from across the country can apply, and potential lenders from across the 
country can respond. For banks this removes the usual constraint that most banks can interact with most 
borrowers only if they maintain a branch nearby that borrower’s location. For us as researchers the 
platform, which has provided us with all borrower information as forwarded to the participating banks, 
allows to attribute a bank’s propensity to offer and the attractiveness of its offers directly to properties 
of the applicant’s region, and its relationship with the bank’s own location. In particular, the fact that 
we observe the responses from different, and differently located, banks, as well as responses from each 
bank to different, and differently located, households, allows us to close down any biases from the 
selection of different types of households to different types of banks. We obtain three key findings. 
First, we observe that when responding to an application from a market with a HHI of 0.25, above which 
the US DoJ would call it highly concentrated, a bank is up to 3.5% more likely to make an offer and in 
addition is willing to lower its price by up to 6.7 basis points, relative to a market with a  HHI of 0.15, 
below which the US DoJ considers markets to have a low market concentration. This finding may be 
counter-intuitive prima facie, where one may have expected that higher concentration allows banks to 
the opposite to make less attractive offers. But more concentrated markets also offer online bidders the 
chance to get “a foot in the door” in markets with in expectation more attractive follow-on business. For 
potential borrowers located in such hitherto more concentrated markets, this implies that the availability 
of an online platform can lead to more and better mortgage offers. 
We have obtained these findings by instrumenting actual cantonal market concentration with 
concentrations predicted from the need of the Swiss big two banks to cut their domestic mortgage 
lending following losses in the US. While the exploitation of pre-existing variation in exposure to 
exogenous supply shifts has recently been exploited by a number of papers, it is particularly clean in our 
setup of interest, as the US crisis struck virtually all global banks with US presence and is arguably quite 




Second, banks offer about 2% (1%) more often and in addition reduce their prices by about 2bp (1bps) 
more if the applicant’s state has a one standard deviation lower unemployment rate (house price change) 
correlation with the bank’s own state. So the platform allows banks to improve the inter-regional 
allocation of their mortgage portfolio and hence ceteris paribus improve their risk management 
following amongst others Quigly and Van Order (1991). We deem the risk management benefits from 
more inter-regional diversification to dominate potential increases in the cost of raising information on 
more regions, as validly raised by Loutskina and Strahan (2014), in the market analyzed. For collateral 
values here are assessed with the same hedonic models country-wide and information on borrowers are 
equally reliable regardless of the region. Yet we acknowledge that we cannot explicitly compare default 
rates on more versus less distant residential mortgage lending, as the period analyzed has few defaults. 
Third, in our Online Appendix we investigate in addition the dispersion of offered prices around those 
predicted by the set of factors discussed above, and interpret it as cases in which decision-making is not 
fully automated or is even escalated to more senior staff. As expected, we find more automation for 
safer loans, by larger banks, and by banks more specialized in mortgage lending. We also find that the 
degree of automation thus measured increases the more online responses the bank has already sent out. 
This suggests that longer participation can help banks reduce operational costs. Absent a crisis we do 
not yet know for sure whether such automation increases the potential for erroneous decisions in the 
sense of under- (or over-) pricing credit risk. We do however observe banks to price in all commonly 
considered mortgage risk factors such as LTV and LTI ratios, , so we have no reason to suspect that 
banks are less careful when offering mortgages online than when they do so offline. 
Overall our findings suggest potential improvements for borrowers as well as for financial stability that 
can be achieved through online platforms. So it will be interesting to see how the use of platforms with 
associated costs and risks develops going forward. In the present paper we have been able to analyze 
this in an unusually clear way by isolating banks’ willingness to lend to different regions, and by 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  N Mean SD Min Max 
(A) Applicant Characteristics           
Year 25'125 2011 1 2010 2013 
Month 25'125 6 3 1 12 
Mortgage Amount in CHF 25'125 566'274 332'695 100'000 2'000'000 
I(New Mortg.=1) 25'125 0.54 0.5 0 1 
Loan-to-Value (LTV) 25'125 64.5 17.3 15 90 
I (LTV > 67%) 25'125 0.53 0.5 0 1 
I (LTV > 80%) 25'125 0.08 0.26 0 1 
Loan-to-Income (LTI) 25'125 3.59 1.52 0.69 9.62 
I (LTI > 4.5) 25'125 0.23 0.42 0 1 
I (LTI > 5.5) 25'125 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Household Total Income 25'125 167'603 88'961 48'000 600'000 
Household Rental Income 25'125 4'232 16'880 0 116'000 
Household Other Income 25'125 9'381 28'329 0 200'000 
Household Wealth incl. Pension Fund 25'125 469'333 515'877 10'000 3'180'000 
Applicant Age 25'125 46 10 28 73 
I(Applicant Age>=38) 25'125 0.22 0.41 0 1 
(B) Regional Characteristics           
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) 25'125 0.18 0.05 0.12 0.49 
Multi-Market Contact (MMC) Index 25'125 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.4 
Cantonal Share of Foreigners in 2010 25'125 20.8 5.3 9.74 39.11 
Number of Online Providers (NOP) 25'125 10.92 2.52 4 14 
Single-Family Home Price Growth 25'125 4.07 4.07 -3.99 15.27 
(C) Bank Characteristics           
Bank Total Assets (TA) 25'125 16'932 12'841 434 37'804 
Mortgages/TA 25'125 69.82 10.43 39.79 90.62 
Deposits/TA 25'125 47.8 17.9 16.72 65.63 
Capital Ratio 25'125 7.25 1.03 4.72 11.33 
Experience in 1'000 Web Responses 25'125 4.07 2.94 0.00 10.15 
(D) Interaction Characteristics           
Correlation of Unempl. Rates 1973-2019 25'125 0.92 0.66 0.68 1 
House price growth correlation 25'125 0.77 0.19 0.15 1 
Responses per Application 25'125 4.24 1.45 1 10 
Response Time in Hours 25'125 97.41 151.72 -2.73 789.1 
I (Offer = 1) 25'125 0.82 0.38 0 1 
Weighted Rate Offered 20'583 2.16 0.56 0.93 3.25 
Weighted Spread Offered 20'583 0.9 0.21 0.49 1.52 
 
Panel (A) shows applicant characteristics for all responses sent in 2010-2013, so the weight of each application corresponds to the 
number of responses included in our regressions. (B) shows bank-relevant characteristics of the region where the collateral is based. 
The NOP, HHI and MMC measures of competition vary across the 26 cantons. (C) shows key bank characteristics. (D) shows key 
response characteristics, including the number of responses the bank has already sent out. Unemployment and house price change 
correlation measure the correlation between the applicant’s and the bank’s canton. Weighted Spread is the amount-weighted 




Table 2: Entering Concentrated Markets 
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price 
              
HHI 0.78*** -0.54*** 1.20*** -0.57*** 1.51*** -0.50*** 
  (0.29) (0.04) (0.31) (0.04) (0.44) (0.04) 
I(LTV>=67%) -0.05* 0.05*** -0.05* 0.05***     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
I(LTV>=80%) -0.85*** 0.03*** -0.86*** 0.03***     
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)     
I(LTI>=4.5) -0.18*** 0.00 -0.18*** 0.00     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
I(LTI>=5.5) -0.85*** 0.03*** -0.86*** 0.03***     
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)     
I(New Mortg.=1) 0.10*** 0.02*** 0.10*** 0.02***     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
House price growth -1.40* 0.09 -0.92 -0.05     
  (0.77) (0.10) (0.80) (0.09)     
Number of Web Providers 0.02*** -0.01*** 0.02*** -0.01***     
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)     
Ln(Total Assets) 0.06*** -0.05***         
  (0.01) (0.00)         
Mortgages/TA 0.02*** -0.00***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Deposits/TA -0.02*** 0.00***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Equity/TA 0.04*** 0.02***         
  (0.01) (0.00)         
Constant -0.46* 1.67*** 0.67** 1.20***   1.02*** 
  (0.27) (0.05) (0.27) (0.03)   (0.02) 
              
d(Offer)/d(HHI) 0.18***   0.28***   0.35***   
  (0.07)   (0.07)   (0.10)   
Observations 25,125 20,583 25,113 20,583 24,428 20,583 
Estimation IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV 2SRI Logit IV 
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 







HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), i.e. the sum of squared market shares, in cantonal mortgage markets in the year of the bank 
response. It is instrumented with its prediction, obtained as the HHI level in 2009 plus the predicted change. The predicted change is  the 
Switzerland-wide change between 2009 and the year of the bank response, times the cantonal market share of the “Big Two” banks UBS and 
CS in 2009. That market share is measured in terms of mortgage volumes. Household controls include indicators for loan-to-value (LTV) ratios 
above 2/3 and above 80%, for Loan-to-Income (LTI) ratios above 4.5 and above 5.5, and for a new rather than refinancing mortgage 
application, as well as cantonal house price growth and the number of other banks also offering online to that canton. Bank controls include 
the log of the responding bank’s total assets and the shares in total assets of respectively mortgages, deposits, and equity. Columns with 
unequal numbers analyze banks’ response to HHI in terms of offer propensities using (IV) Probit regressions (except for Column 5 due to the 
incidental parameter problem, see text), Columns with equal numbers analyze the response in terms of the spread above maturity-congruent 
interest rate swap rates. Columns 1-2 use both household and bank controls, 3-4 replace bank controls with bank fixed effects, while 5-6 also 
replace household controls with fixed effects for household groups constructed from the LTV range, the LTI range, the refinancing indicator, 
a year dummy and a month dummy. See text for the rationale. Column 5 combines logit with 2-stage residual inclusion (2SRI), see Section 4.3 





Table 3: For which Households Are Responses to Local Market Concentration Strongest 
              
  (1) Offer (2) Price (3) Offer (4) Price (5) Offer (6) Price 
HHI 0.71 -0.36*** 1.60 -0.36*** 2.17* -0.42*** 
  (0.63) (0.09) (0.00) (0.09) (1.27) (0.08) 
HHI*I(Age < 38) 0.60 -0.18* 0.13 -0.19** 1.31 -0.18* 
  (0.67) (0.10) (0.00) (0.10) (1.05) (0.10) 
HHI*I(New) -0.07 -0.23*** -0.14 -0.24*** -0.61 -0.16* 
  (0.57) (0.09) (0.00) (0.08) (0.90) (0.09) 
HHI*(Foreign Share) -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) 
HHI*I(Amount ≥ 1 mio) -0.65 -0.17 -0.88 -0.24* -2.71 -0.17 
  (0.95) (0.13) (0.00) (0.13) (1.74) (0.13) 
I(LTV>=67%) -0.04 0.05*** -0.06 0.05***     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
I(LTV>=80%) -0.85*** 0.03*** -0.78 0.03***     
  (0.05) (0.01) (550.85) (0.01)     
I(LTI>=4.5) -0.17*** 0.00 -0.14 0.00     
  (0.03) (0.00) (150.80) (0.00)     
I(LTI>=5.5) -0.84*** 0.03*** -0.78 0.03***     
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)     
I(New Mortg.=1) 0.12 0.07*** 0.12 0.07***     
  (0.11) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)     
I(Age < 38) -0.13 0.04** -0.03 0.04**     
  (0.13) (0.02) (261.21) (0.02)     
(Foreign Share) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
I(Amount ≥ 1 mio) -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.30 0.02 
  (0.19) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.34) (0.03) 
House price growth -1.38* 0.10 -2.43 -0.03     
  (0.78) (0.10) (0.00) (0.09)     
Number of Web 
Providers 
0.02*** -0.01*** 0.01 -0.01*** 0.04*** -0.01*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (1.12) (0.01) (0.00) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.06*** -0.05***         
  (0.01) (0.00)         
Mortgages/TA 0.02*** -0.00***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Deposits/TA -0.02*** 0.00***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Equity/TA 0.04*** 0.02***         
  (0.01) (0.00)         
Constant -0.52* 1.64*** 0.46 1.16***   1.11*** 
  (0.31) (0.05) (0.00) (0.03)   (0.02) 
Observations 25,125 20,583 25,113 20,583 24,428 20,583 
Estimation IV Probit IV IV Probit IV 2SRI Logit IV 
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
HH Group FE No No No No Yes Yes 
This table follows largely the same specification and methodology as Table 2, but adds interactions of the HHI measure with 
an indicator for applicants aged below 38, with an indicator for a new mortgage application rather than a refinancing 
application, with the share of foreigners resident in the applicant’s canton in 2010, and with an indicator for amounts greater 
CHF 1 mio. It instruments these with their interactions with our instrument from Table 2. See notes of Table 2 for further 






Table 4: Risk Management through Unemployment Complementarity 
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price 
              
Unemp. Complementarity 1.36*** -0.33*** 0.64*** -0.24*** 2.41*** -0.25*** 
  (0.21) (0.03) (0.24) (0.03) (0.66) (0.03) 
HHI 0.17 -0.39*** 0.49* -0.43***     
  (0.26) (0.03) (0.27) (0.03)     
I(LTV>=67%) -0.05* 0.05*** -0.05* 0.05***     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
I(LTV>=80%) -0.84*** 0.02*** -0.85*** 0.03***     
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)     
I(LTI>=4.5) -0.18*** -0.00 -0.17*** 0.00     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
I(LTI>=5.5) -0.86*** 0.03*** -0.86*** 0.03***     
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)     
I(New Mortg.=1) 0.09*** 0.02*** 0.09*** 0.02***     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
Ln(Total Assets) 0.03** -0.04***         
  (0.01) (0.00)         
Mortgages/TA 0.02*** -0.00***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Deposits/TA -0.01*** 0.00*         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Equity/TA 0.07*** 0.01***         
  (0.01) (0.00)         
Constant 0.90*** 1.31*** 1.67*** 0.85***   0.72*** 
  (0.29) (0.05) (0.35) (0.04)   (0.04) 
              
d(Offer)/d(Compl.) 0.32***   0.15***   0.10*   
  (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.05)   
Observations 25,060 20,533 25,048 20,533 9,689 20,533 
Estimation Probit OLS Probit OLS Logit OLS 
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 






The unemployment rate complementarity is the inverse of the correlation (scaled between -1 and 1) between 
unemployment rates in 1973-2019 (longest available period) in the canton of the applicant and those in the canton 
of the bank. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index for cantonal market concentration, all other controls as in Table 
2. Columns with unequal numbers analyze banks’ response in terms of offer propensities using Probit regressions 
(except for Column 5 due to the incidental parameter problem, see text), Columns with equal numbers analyze the 
response in terms of the spread above maturity-congruent interest rate swap rates. Columns 1-2 use both household 
and bank controls, 3-4 replace bank controls with bank fixed effects, while 5-6 also replace household controls with 
now full-fledged household fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by household. * p<0.1, ** p 





Table 5: Automating Market Entry and Diversification around a Common Rule 
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Offer Spread Offer Spread Offer Spread 
  Discretion Discretion Discretion Discretion Discretion Discretion 
              
I(LTV>=67%) 0.05 0.53*** 0.05 0.38***     
  (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.11)     
I(LTV>=80%) 0.62*** -0.01 0.70*** -0.00     
  (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.11)     
I(LTI>=4.5) 0.21*** 0.03 0.24*** 0.02     
  (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.10)     
I(LTI>=5.5) 0.56*** 0.01 0.62*** 0.06     
  (0.04) (0.16) (0.05) (0.16)     
I(New 
Mortg.=1) -0.20*** -0.04 -0.25*** -0.02     
  (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.10)     
Ln(Total Assets) -0.05** -0.15***         
  (0.02) (0.04)         
Mortgages/TA -0.02*** -0.03***         
  (0.00) (0.01)         
Deposits/TA 0.02*** 0.02***         
  (0.00) (0.01)         
Equity/TA -0.08*** 0.03         
  (0.02) (0.03)         
HHI -0.80** -0.66 -1.25*** -1.15 -1.34*** -0.77 
  (0.34) (0.76) (0.38) (0.88) (0.36) (0.69) 
HP Growth -1.76*** -0.50 -1.78*** -1.86* -0.10 0.00 
  (0.56) (1.18) (0.59) (1.13) (0.84) (1.88) 
Number 
Providers -0.04*** -0.04** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.03* 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Unemp. Compl. -1.67*** -1.40* -1.03*** 1.25 -1.11*** -0.10 
  (0.34) (0.72) (0.39) (0.95) (0.33) (0.75) 
Experience -0.02** 0.00 0.00 -0.11*** -0.08*** 0.07 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) 
Constant -1.61*** -1.80* -2.29*** -2.28** -1.99*** -3.12*** 
  (0.46) (1.01) (0.51) (1.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
              
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
HH FE No No No No Yes Yes 
 
Regressors and specifications follow those in Tables 2-4, but add “Experience” as the number of online 
mortgage applications (In 1’000) the responding bank has already processed since the platform start in 
2008. In the Online Appendix we display the underlying mean equation relating offers and prices to 
these regressors. Here we display the variance equation relating the log of the squared residual from 
the mean equation to the regressors of interest. Standard errors in parentheses are robust. * p<0.1, ** 
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 “The Geography of Mortgage Lending in Times of FinTech” 
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In this Online Appendix, Section A1 briefly discusses a number of robustness checks on our analyses 
on market concentration, A2 those on risk management, and A3 those on automation. Following that, 
A4 investigates the extent to which borrowers and lenders on the platform we study are representative 
of the full national mortgage market, before A5 presents the corresponding tables. 
A1. Local Market Concentration 
To start with, Table AT1 repeats our analyses on banks’ responses to local competition, but to instrument 
cantonal mortgage market competition it maps the lending reduction of the Big Two into cantons based 
on the big two banks’ prior market share measured in terms of deposit volumes rather than mortgage 
volumes. Relatedly, Table AT2 computes the mapping on the basis of the number of deposit accounts 
rather than deposit volumes. Apart from using a different instrument, both tables follow exactly the same 
structure as Table 2 in the paper in terms of both left- and right-hand side variables. The results of both 
checks can be summarized very briefly in that results are very similar in terms of sign, statistical 
significance and even size. This reflects that in Swiss domestic commercial banking market shares in 
deposit and mortgage markets tend to be linked very closely.  
Following that, Table AT3 presents in columns 1-3 the first-stage regressions underlying Table 2, in 
columns 4-6 those underlying Table AT1, and in columns 7-9 those underlying Table AT2. The table 
shows that with all three instruments we obtain very strong first stage coefficients of interest, so that our 
analyses do not suffer from weak instruments.  
Concluding our robustness checks on Competition alone, Table AT4 repeats the analyses from Table 2 
but uses Ordinary Least Squares instead of Instrumental Variable regressions, and complements the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) of cantonal market concentration with the Multi-Market Contact 
(MMC) measure of competition intensity as used also in Degryse and Ongena (2007). This follows 
Edwards’ (1955) idea of a “linked oligopoly” under which multi-market contact increases banks’ 
incentives to collude and hence leads them to behave less competitively. On the other hand though, Park 




behavior. So we need to look at the data to find out. Either way, the MMC measure for each canton sums 
the number of bank pairs present after weighting each pair by the number of other cantons in which this 
pair does also encounter each other. More formally, we denote the 26 cantons by indicator j, and the 180 
banks with any mortgages in 2009 by indicators k and l. Then we let Dij =1 if bank i operates in canton 
j and 0 otherwise. So 𝑎𝑘𝑙 = ∑ 𝐷𝑘𝑗𝐷𝑙𝑗
26
𝑗=1  tells us for each pair of banks (k,l) in how many of the 26 
cantons they encounter each other, and fj indicates how many pairs of banks we encounter in canton j. 








The coefficients in columns 1-4 suggest that when the average bank active in the applicant’s canton 
meets more of its competitors there also in other cantons, it is more likely to offer also here and at more 
competitive prices. This is more in line with the findings of Park and Penacchi (2008), whereby multi-
market contact promotes competitive behavior, than with the original “linked oligopoly” hypothesis of 
Edwards (1955) whereby it promotes collusion. We note however that in the setup studied multi-market 
competition loses its economic and statistical significance in columns 5-6 where we control for both 
bank and household group effect. We attribute this to the fact that the Swiss mortgage market is 
characterized by many small banks who often meet each other only in a very limited number of cantonal 
markets. This feature of many small hitherto rather local banks however is one that motivates also our 
second field of interest of how going online allows them to become less local with potential benefits for 
their portfolio diversification. 
A2. Risk Management 
Table AT5 replaces the complementarity measure based on unemployment rates with complementarity 
based on house price changes. Here the results of one standard deviation change in the complementarity 
measure go in the same direction and are equally statistically significant, but are smaller in magnitude. 
We take this to reflect that the collateral value comes into play only after borrowers’ incomes become 
insufficient to keep servicing the mortgage. 
Finally, Table AT6 combines our baseline analyses on banks’ responses to market concentration from 
Table 2 with the baseline analyses on risk management incentives from Table 4. In contrast to Table 4 
and in line with Table 2, columns 5 and 6 can control for household group fixed effects but not use fixed 
effects for every single household due to collinearity with the only inter-cantonal variation in HHI. 
Overall the table strongly confirms our findings on bank responses to both HHI and risk management 
considerations. The average marginal effect of HHI on offer propensities in column (3, 5) shrinks 
slightly from 0.18 to 0.15 (0.28 to 0.24; 0.35 to 0.22), but remains economically and statistically 
significant. The effect of unemployment complementarity in column 1 (3, 5) remains unchanged at 0.32 




that across all responses banks submit the correlation of our HHI measure of market concentration with 
unemployment complementarity is only 15%. Likewise that with house price change complementarity 
is only 19%. Nonetheless, we decided to discuss competition and risk management separately above to 
give both sufficient attention and as they are linked to different strands of the literature. 
A3. Automation 
Table AT7 presents the mean equation estimates underlying the variance equation estimates displayed 
in Table 5. Maybe the most interesting finding is that our pricing equations achieve R2 values of 29% 
even with only a limited number of household and bank controls, 31% when we replace bank controls 
with bank fixed effects, and 34% when we additionally replace household controls with household group 
fixed effects. This is significantly higher than e.g. the 18% in Petersen and Rajan (2002) or even than 
the 22% in Degryse and Ongena (2005). We attribute this not to the sophistication of our model, but 
rather to the fact that in the setup studied banks disposed of reliable hard, but no soft information, 
favoring more rule-based decision-making. How they decide in response to household and bank 
characteristics, market concentration or portfolio complementarity corresponds to what we have already 
discussed in the main paper, but the one additional finding worth mentioning here is that offer 
probability is found to increase by 1% with each 1’000 responses already sent out. By contrast, the effect 
of experience on pricing is not robust across specifications. 
A4. Sample Representativeness 
An important question when analyzing data from online lending is how representative these are of the 
offline market. To start with, Table AT8 presents the distribution of all 6’920 mortgage applications 
submitted between 2010 and 2013 across the 26 cantons, in column 1 in terms of absolute numbers and 
in column 2 in percent. In column 3 it then compares that distribution with the percentage of new 
mortgage borrowers in the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) by the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics 
stemming from each of the 26 cantons. A new mortgage borrower is defined as a household who first 
transitions from renter to home owner in 2008-131 and so has mortgage debt in 2014. Finally, column 4 
presents the distribution of cantons of all existing mortgages on bank balance sheets as of 2013. Overall, 
we find that the distribution of applications is quite representative of the market as a whole and is not 
for example biased toward more urban areas or toward any of the four language regions. 
Likewise, Table AT9 contrasts the geographical distribution of the headquarters of the 27 banks in our 
sample with that of the universe of Swiss retail banks used in Basten and Mariathasan (2018). That paper 
starts out from the universe of all Swiss banks and then zooms in on the 50 retail banks by following the 
supervisor’s definition of a retail bank as one that earns at least 55% of its income either as net interest 
                                                     




income or as loan fees. Of course, the distribution of banks is less smooth in our sample than that of 
households given only 27 banks in total. Yet we observe that the sample includes banks from across the 
country with greater numbers of banks stemming from the most populated cantons Zurich, St. Gallen 
and Berne as well as Aargau and Basel. But it includes also representatives from French-speaking 
Geneva, Valais and Vaud, as well as from Italian-speaking Ticino. Overall, this makes us confident that 
the findings presented below are representative of bank behavior across all of Switzerland. Given the 
heterogeneity of Switzerland in terms of language, religion, topography and urbanization, we argue that 
despite the limited size of the country, behavior is also representative of that in larger countries. 
Finally, Table AT10 looks beyond geography. Panel A compares the characteristics of households in 
our sample to those of households in the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) who recently acquired real estate. 
Panel B compares mortgage risk characteristics in our sample to those reported in the SNB Financial 
Stability Report 2014. Panel C finally compares the key characteristics of banks in our sample to those 
reported for all retail banks in Basten and Mariathasan (2018). In all three cases, we report all 
characteristics that are available both in our sample and reported in the respective benchmark. Column 
1 always reports the mean value, and in brackets the standard error, in our sample, and column 2 those 
in the benchmark—except for Panel B as SNB (2014) does not report standard errors. Panel A thus 
shows that households in our sample have virtually the same average age, but a higher household 
income. While the difference is not significant statistically, we deem it is significant economically. We 
do not see any obvious way in which this would distort the results of our bank-focused analyses, yet this 
difference is to be kept in mind.  
For the key risk characteristics of households displayed in Panel B, the best available benchmark for 
this is SNB (2014). Based on a bank survey that covers the 25 largest mortgage lenders and thereby 80% 
of the market, it reports that 16% of mortgages start with an LTV value above 80%. But note that, as 
discussed in more detail in Basten (2020), these SNB values are based on asking each of the twenty-five 
largest mortgage lenders for the 50th, 75th, 90th, and 95th percentiles of their LTV distribution and then 
inferring from this which fraction of its mortgages had LTV ratios >80%. As this does not allow a sharp 
distinction between LTV≥80 and LTV>80, while our sample has a bunching of applications at LTV 
values of 79% and 80%, we report both the fraction of observations with LTV > 80, which is 8%, and 
the fraction with LTV>=80%, which is 23%. The value of 16% reported for the SNB sample is hence 
in between our two values, so that we cannot reject the null of no significant difference between the 
samples. Furthermore, they report 18% of households starting with a Payment to Income (PTI) ratio 
above 33%, where the annual payment is computed as 5% of the loan for interest plus 1% for 
amortization plus 1% of the loan for house maintenance. When we multiply our LTI ratios with 0.07, 
we find that 17% of households start out with a PTI ratio in excess of 1/3. Unfortunately we cannot 




data. However, the differences of 1 percentage point each suggest that from the household side the 
Comparis data are overall representative of the offline market, featuring neither a flight of particularly 
risky households from offline to online lending, nor a particular eagerness by particularly safe 
households to obtain better conditions online. 
Finally, Panel C shows that banks in our sample have a very similar risk-weighted capital ratio, but tend 
to be somewhat smaller and more deposit-financed. This likely reflects the fact that for larger banks it 
is more easily worthwhile starting their own platform or expanding their offline branch network, while 






Table AT1: Competition with instrument based on deposit volumes 
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price 
              
HHI 0.81*** -0.53*** 1.21*** -0.56*** 1.34*** -0.48*** 
  (0.29) (0.04) (0.31) (0.04) (0.43) (0.04) 
I(LTV>=67%) -0.05* 0.05*** -0.05* 0.05***     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
I(LTV>=80%) -0.85*** 0.03*** -0.86*** 0.03***     
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)     
I(LTI>=4.5) -0.18*** 0.00 -0.18*** 0.00     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
I(LTI>=5.5) -0.85*** 0.03*** -0.86*** 0.03***     
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)     
I(New Mortg.=1) 0.10*** 0.02*** 0.10*** 0.02***     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
House price growth -1.42* 0.08 -0.93 -0.06     
  (0.77) (0.10) (0.80) (0.09)     
Number of Web 
Providers 
0.02*** -0.01*** 0.02*** -0.01***     
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)     
Ln(Total Assets) 0.06*** -0.05***         
  (0.01) (0.00)         
Mortgages/TA 0.02*** -0.00***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Deposits/TA -0.02*** 0.00***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Equity/TA 0.04*** 0.02***         
  (0.01) (0.00)         
Constant -0.46* 1.67*** 0.67** 1.20*** 1.18*** 1.02*** 
  (0.27) (0.05) (0.27) (0.03) (0.36) (0.02) 
              
d(Offer)/d(HHI) 0.19***   0.28***   0.21***   
  (0.07)   (0.07)   -0.07   
Observations 25,125 20,583 25,113 20,583 25,113 20,583 
Estimation IV Probit IV IV Probit IV 2SRI Logit IV 
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 




HHI is the Herfindahl -Hirschmann Index (HHI), i.e. the sum of squared market shares, in cantonal mortgage markets in the 
year of the bank response. It is instrumented with its prediction, obtained as the HHI level in 2009 plus the predicted change. 
The latter is obtained as Switzerland-wide change between 2009 and the year of the bank response times the cantonal market 
share of the “Big Two” banks UBS and CS in 2009. In contrast to Table 2 and 3, market share is now measured in terms of 
deposit volumes. Household and bank controls as in Table 2. Columns with unequal numbers analyze banks’ response to HHI 
in terms of offer propensities using (IV) Probit regressions (except for Column 5 due to the incidental parameter problem, 
see text), Columns with equal numbers analyze the response in terms of the spread above maturity-congruent interest rate 
swap rates. Columns 1-2 use both household and bank controls, 3-4 replace bank controls with bank fixed effects, while 5-6 
also replace household controls with fixed effects for household groups constructed from the LTV range, the LTI range, the 
refinancing indicator, a year dummy and a month dummy. Column 5 combines logit with 2-stage residual inclusion (2SRI), 





Table AT2: Competition with instrument based on deposit accounts 
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price 
              
HHI 0.80*** -0.52*** 1.18*** -0.55*** 1.44*** -0.48*** 
  (0.29) (0.04) (0.31) (0.04) (0.45) (0.04) 
I(LTV>=67%) -0.05* 0.05*** -0.05* 0.05***     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
I(LTV>=80%) -0.85*** 0.03*** -0.86*** 0.03***     
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)     
I(LTI>=4.5) -0.18*** 0.00 -0.18*** 0.00     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
I(LTI>=5.5) -0.85*** 0.03*** -0.86*** 0.03***     
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)     
I(New Mortg.=1) 0.10*** 0.02*** 0.10*** 0.02***     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
House price growth -1.42* 0.07 -0.91 -0.06     
  (0.77) (0.10) (0.80) (0.09)     
Number of Web 
Providers 
0.02*** -0.01*** 0.02*** -0.01***     
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)     
Ln(Total Assets) 0.06*** -0.05***         
  (0.01) (0.00)         
Mortgages/TA 0.02*** -0.00***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Deposits/TA -0.02*** 0.00***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Equity/TA 0.04*** 0.02***         
  (0.01) (0.00)         
Constant -0.46* 1.67*** 0.67** 1.19***   1.02*** 
  (0.27) (0.05) (0.27) (0.03)   (0.02) 
              
d(Offer)/d(HHI) 0.19***   0.27***   0.34***   
  (0.07)   (0.07)   (0.11)   
Observations 25,125 20,583 25,113 20,583 24,428 20,583 
Estimation IV Probit IV IV Probit IV 2SRI Logit IV 
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
HH Group FE No No No No Yes Yes 
 
  
HHI is the Herfindahl -Hirschmann Index (HHI), i.e. the sum of squared market shares, in cantonal mortgage 
markets in the year of the bank response. It is instrumented with its prediction, obtained as the HHI level in 2009 
plus the predicted change. The latter is obtained as Switzerland-wide change between 2009 and the year of the 
bank response times the cantonal market share of the “Big Two” banks UBS and CS in 2009. In contrast to Table 
2 and 3, market share is now measured in terms of the number of deposit accounts. Household and bank controls 
as in Table 2. Columns with unequal numbers analyze banks’ response to HHI in terms of offer propensities using 
(IV) Probit regressions (except for Column 5 due to the incidental parameter problem, see text), Columns with 
equal numbers analyze the response in terms of the spread above maturity-congruent interest rate swap rates. 
Columns 1-2 use both household and bank controls, 3-4 replace bank controls with bank fixed effects, while 5-6 
also replace household controls with fixed effects for household groups constructed from the LTV range, the LTI 
range, the refinancing indicator, a year dummy and a month dummy. Column 5 combines logit with 2-stage 
residual inclusion (2SRI), see Section 4 for details. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by household 





Table AT3: First Stage Regressions for Competition Analyses
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
HHI HHI HHI HHI HHI HHI HHI HHI HHI
Mortg. Vol. Share 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.96***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dep. Vol. Share 0.96*** 0.95*** 0.96***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dep. No. 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.97***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
I(LTV>=67%) -0.00* -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
I(LTV>=80%) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
I(LTI>=4.5) 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00** 0.00* 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
I(LTI>=5.5) -0.00** -0.00* -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
I(New Mortg.=1) 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
House price growth 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.26***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of Web Providers 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mortgages/TA 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Deposits/TA -0.00* -0.00 -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Equity/TA 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 25,125 25,125 25,125 25,125 25,125 25,125 25,125 25,125 25,125
R2 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95
This table shows in Columns 1-3 the first-stage (FS) regressions underlying our IV regressions in Table 2, in Columns 4-6 
those underlying Table A1, and in Columns 7-9 those underlying Table A2. In each of these, the first column always shows 
the version with both household and bank controls, the second shows that with household controls and bank fixed effects, 
and the third shows that with household group fixed effects and bank fixed effects. All controls are the same as in the 
respective second-stage IV regressions. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by household group.  * p<0.1, ** p 






Table AT4: Competition without instrument, with Multi-Market Contact (MMC) 
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price 
              
HHI 0.55 -0.34*** 0.60* -0.44*** 1.17** -0.49*** 
  (0.33) (0.04) (0.35) (0.04) (0.48) (0.04) 
I(LTV>=67%) -0.05* 0.05*** -0.05* 0.05***     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
I(LTV>=80%) -0.85*** 0.03*** -0.86*** 0.03***     
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)     
I(LTI>=4.5) -0.18*** 0.00 -0.18*** 0.00     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
I(LTI>=5.5) -0.86*** 0.03*** -0.86*** 0.03***     
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)     
I(New Mortg.=1) 0.10*** 0.02*** 0.10*** 0.02***     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
House price growth -1.09 -0.17* -0.26 -0.20**     
  (0.82) (0.09) (0.85) (0.09)     
Number of Web 
Providers 
0.02*** -0.01*** 0.03*** -0.01***     
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)     
Multi-Market 
Competition 
0.75 -0.61*** 1.80*** -0.39*** 0.16 0.07 
  (0.55) (0.07) (0.61) (0.08) (0.78) (0.06) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.06*** -0.05***         
  (0.01) (0.00)         
Mortgages/TA 0.02*** -0.00***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Deposits/TA -0.02*** 0.00***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Equity/TA 0.04*** 0.02***         
  (0.01) (0.00)         
Constant -0.56* 1.75*** 0.47* 1.24***   1.01*** 
  (0.29) (0.05) (0.28) (0.03)   (0.02) 
              
d(Offer)/d(HHI) 0.13   0.14*   0.28**   
  (0.08)   (0.08)   (0.11)   
Observations 25,125 20,583 25,113 20,583 24,428 20,583 
Estimation Probit OLS Probit OLS Logit OLS 
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 




Variables correspond to those in Table 2, but here the HHI is not instrumented. Furthermore, we additionally include 
here the Multi-Market Contact (MMC) measure, as explained in the text. Columns 1, 3 and 5 analyze the response 
in terms of offer propensities, while columns with equal numbers analyze the response in terms of the spread above 
maturity-congruent interest rate swap rates. Columns 1-2 use both household and bank controls, 3-4 replace bank 
controls with bank fixed effects, while 5-6 also replace household controls with fixed effects for household groups 
constructed from the LTV range, the LTI range, the refinancing indicator, a year dummy and a month dummy. See 





Table AT5: Risk Management through House Price Change Complementarity 
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price 
              
House price change 
complementarity 
0.24*** -0.03*** 0.05 -0.05*** -0.05 -0.06*** 
  (0.07) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.26) (0.01) 
HHI 0.20 -0.40*** 0.59** -0.42***     
  (0.25) (0.03) (0.27) (0.03)     
I(LTV>=67%) -0.05* 0.05*** -0.05* 0.05***     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
I(LTV>=80%) -0.84*** 0.02*** -0.85*** 0.03***     
  (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)     
I(LTI>=4.5) -0.17*** -0.00 -0.17*** 0.00     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
I(LTI>=5.5) -0.86*** 0.03*** -0.87*** 0.03***     
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)     
I(New Mortg.=1) 0.09*** 0.02*** 0.09*** 0.02***     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
Ln(Total Assets) 0.03** -0.04***         
  (0.01) (0.00)         
Mortgages/TA 0.01*** -0.00***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Deposits/TA -0.01*** 0.00***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Equity/TA 0.05*** 0.01***         
  (0.01) (0.00)         
Constant 0.02 1.54*** 1.05*** 1.04***   0.90*** 
  (0.24) (0.03) (0.26) (0.03)   (0.02) 
d(Offer)/d(Compl) 0.06***   0.01   -0.01   
  (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.05)   
Observations 25,125 20,583 25,113 20,583 9,759 20,583 
Estimation Probit OLS Probit OLS Logit OLS 
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
HH FE No No No No Yes Yes 
 
  
The house price (HP) change complementarity is the inverse of the correlation (scaled between -1 and 1) between 
year-on-year house price changes in the canton of the applicant and those in the canton of the bank. HHI is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index for cantonal market concentration, all other controls as in Table 2. Columns with 
unequal numbers analyze banks’ response in terms of offer propensities using Probit regressions (except for 
Column 5 due to the incidental parameter problem, see text), Columns with equal numbers analyze the response 
in terms of the spread above maturity-congruent interest rate swap rates. Columns 1-2 use both household and 
bank controls, 3-4 replace bank controls with bank fixed effects, while 5-6 also replace household controls with 
now household fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by household. * p<0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
 
Columns with unequal numbers show marginal effects from Probit regressions. The correlation between past house 
price changes in the applicant’s and the bank’s canton is instrumented with an indicator for language mismatch 
between the two regions. The additional control relative over-heating indicates the estimated house price over-
heating (i.e. actual over fundamentally justified house prices, as computed by FPRE consultants) in the applicant’s 
relative to the bank’s home canton. HHI in Columns 5 and 6 is instrumented by big banks’ market share in 2009, as 
in Table 2. LTV is the loan-to-value, LTI the loan-to-income ratio of the applicant. About half of all applications are 
for refinancing a mortgage rather than for initial purchase. All estimations include year*month fixed effects to 





Table AT6: Competition and Risk Management Analyses Combined 
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price 
HHI 0.62** -0.51*** 1.06*** -0.54*** 1.27*** -0.46*** 
  (0.29) (0.04) (0.31) (0.04) (0.46) (0.04) 
Unemp. Complementarity 1.36*** -0.32*** 0.64*** -0.23*** 1.18*** -0.24*** 
  (0.21) (0.03) (0.23) (0.03) (0.44) (0.03) 
I(LTV>=67%) -0.05* 0.05*** -0.05* 0.05***     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
I(LTV>=80%) -0.85*** 0.03*** -0.86*** 0.03***     
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)     
I(LTI>=4.5) -0.18*** 0.00 -0.18*** 0.00     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
I(LTI>=5.5) -0.85*** 0.03*** -0.86*** 0.03***     
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)     
I(New Mortg.=1) 0.10*** 0.02*** 0.10*** 0.02***     
  (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)     
House price growth -1.44* 0.08 -0.98 -0.03     
  (0.79) (0.10) (0.82) (0.10)     
Number of Web Providers 0.02*** -0.01*** 0.02*** -0.01***     
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)     
Ln(Total Assets) 0.04*** -0.04***         
  (0.01) (0.00)         
Mortgages/TA 0.02*** -0.00***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Deposits/TA -0.01*** 0.00**         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Equity/TA 0.07*** 0.01***         
  (0.01) (0.00)         
Constant 0.61* 1.42*** 1.36*** 0.96***   0.77*** 
  (0.32) (0.05) (0.36) (0.04)   (0.04) 
              
d(Offer)/d(HHI) 0.15**   0.24***   0.22**   
  (0.07)   (0.07)   (0.11)   
d(Offer)/d(Complement) 0.32***   0.15***   0.20***   
  (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.04)   
Observations 25,060 20,533 25,048 25,060 24,326 20,533 




Bank FE No No Yes No Yes Yes 
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
HH Group FE No No No No Yes Yes 
 
  
This table combines the analyses on the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) from Table 2, including the instrumentation 
strategy, with the Risk Management analyses on unemployment complementarity from Table 4. Following Table 2 and in 
deviation from Table 4, Columns 5 and 6 can control for household group fixed effects capturing all characteristics except 
for the place of residence, but cannot use fixed effects for each single household, as these would be fully collinear with the 
cantonal competition intensity HHI. For all other details, see the notes of Tables 2 and 4. Standard errors in parentheses are 





Table AT7: Mean Equations underlying the Variance Equations in Table 5 
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Offer Spread Offer Spread Offer Spread 
              
I(LTV>=67%) -0.01** 0.04*** -0.01** 0.02***     
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
I(LTV>=80%) -0.25*** 0.02*** -0.25*** 0.02***     
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)     
I(LTI>=4.5) -0.04*** 0.00 -0.03*** 0.00     
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)     
I(LTI>=5.5) -0.27*** 0.03*** -0.28*** 0.03***     
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)     
I(New Mortg.=1) 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.01***     
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
Ln(Total Assets) 0.01** -0.04***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Mortgages/TA 0.00*** -0.00***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Deposits/TA -0.00*** -0.00         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Equity/TA 0.02*** 0.01***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
HHI 0.19*** -0.34*** 0.22*** -0.24*** 0.23*** -0.34*** 
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
HP Growth -0.27** 0.04 -0.06 -0.12 0.06 0.02 
  (0.14) (0.08) (0.13) (0.08) (0.13) (0.09) 
Number Providers 0.01*** -0.01*** 0.01*** -0.01*** 0.01*** -0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Unemp. Compl. 0.21*** -0.27*** 0.13** -0.17*** 0.18*** -0.14*** 
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Experience 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.59 1.23*** 0.84*** 0.88*** 0.82*** 0.91*** 
  (0.00) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
              
Observations 25,060 20,533 25,060 20,533 25,060 20,533 
R2 0.11 0.29 0.13 0.31 0.19 0.34 
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 




This table presents the Mean Equations underlying the Variance Equations displayed in Table 5 in the main 
paper. Experience is the number of online responses the bank has already sent out before, measured in 
units of 1’000. All other variables as in Tables 2-4. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by 





Table AT8: Geographical Representativeness of Households 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Number of Percentage of % of Mortgages % of Volume 
Canton Applications Applications Swiss Household Panel All Swiss Banks 
Aargau 850 12.29 11.70 8.73 
Appenzell IR 4 0.06 1.12 0.62 
Appenzell AR 33 0.48 0.56 0.18 
Basel Land 287 4.15 3.64 3.86 
Basel Stadt 106 1.53 0.28 1.92 
Berne 982 14.19 17.65 10.77 
Fribourg 220 3.18 5.88 3.23 
Geneva 162 2.34 2.24 5.06 
Glarus 30 0.43 0.84 0.44 
Graubünden 163 2.36 1.96 3.33 
Jura 26 0.38 0.56 0.75 
Lucerne 256 3.70 5.32 4.64 
Neuchatel 73 1.06 5.04 1.53 
Nidwalden 20 0.29 0.84 0.54 
Obwalden 35 0.51 0.84 0.47 
Schaffhausen 71 1.03 0.28 0.94 
Schwyz 142 2.05 1.96 2.37 
Solothurn 238 3.44 2.80 3.37 
St.Gallen 339 4.90 6.16 5.73 
Thurgau 233 3.37 3.08 3.48 
Ticino 182 2.63 3.64 4.73 
Uri 17 0.25 0.00 0.40 
Valais 217 3.14 3.92 3.59 
Vaud 607 8.78 7.28 8.07 
Zug 118 1.71 0.56 2.04 
Zurich 1'503 21.74 14.29 19.19 






The distribution in our sample counts each of the 6’914 mortgage applications submitted via 
Comparis.ch once. We can compare it first with the percentages of households in the nationally 
representative Swiss Household Panel (SHP), provided by the Federal Office of Statistics, who 
transition to home ownership in 2008-13 and therefore have outstanding mortgage debt in 2014. 
Finally, we also compare the distribution with that of outstanding mortgage debt already on banks’ 
balance sheets as reported to the supervisory authority in 2013. Note that the latter is available only 
based on all mortgages currently on banks’ balance sheets, rather than on new lending only. Based 
on either comparison, we conclude that the geographical coverage of our mortgage applications is 





Table AT9: Geographical Representativeness of Banks 
 
  Comparis B&M (2018) 
Canton # banks % of banks # banks % of banks 
Aargau 2 7.41 3 6.00 
Appenzell AR 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Appenzell IR 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Basel Land 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Basel Stadt 2 7.41 4 8.00 
Berne 4 14.81 9 18.00 
Fribourg 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Geneva 1 3.70 1 2.00 
Glarus 1 3.70 1 2.00 
Graubünden 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Jura 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Lucerne 1 3.70 1 2.00 
Neuchatel 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Nidwalden 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Obwalden 1 3.70 1 2.00 
Schaffhausen 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Schwyz 1 3.70 1 2.00 
Solothurn 2 7.41 4 8.00 
St. Gallen 4 14.81 3 6.00 
Thurgau 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Ticino 1 3.70 1 2.00 
Uri 1 3.70 1 2.00 
Valais 1 3.70 1 2.00 
Vaud 1 3.70 4 8.00 
Zug 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Zurich 4 14.81 5 10.00 





This table compares the distribution of banks’ headquarters across the 26 
cantons of Switzerland with that in Basten and Mariathasan (2018), who select 
the universe of Swiss retail banks based on the FINMA definition that at least 55% 
of bank income must be net interest income or loan fees, as opposed to stem 





Table AT10: Non-Geographical Representativeness 
 
A. Comparison of household characteristics with the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 
  
Our sample SHP Difference  
(1) (2) (3) 
Age 46.10 45.51 0.60 
  (10.21) (1.17) (10.45) 
Household Income 167'603 147'649 19'999 
  (89'061) (318'066) (172'429) 
Number of observations 25'125 357 25'494 
          
B. Comparison of mortgage risk characteristics with SNB (2014)   
  
Our sample SNB  Difference  
(1) (2) (3) 
Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio > 80% (0/1) 0.08 0.16 -0.09 
 (0.26) (--) (--) 
Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio >= 80% (0/1) 0.23 0.16 +0.07 
 (0.42) (--) (--) 
Payment-to-Income (PTI) ratio>33% (0/1) 0.39 0.40 -0.01 
 (0.13) (--) (--) 
Number of observations 25'125 (--) (--) 
          
C. Comparison of bank characteristics with Basten and Mariathasan (2018) 
  
Our sample B&M (2018) Difference 
(1) (2) (3) 
Total Assets  9'866 12'185 -2'319 
  (11'910) (22'215) (25'206) 
CET1 in % of Total Assets 7.19 7.75 -0.56 
  (1.53) (1.66) (2.26) 
Deposits in % of Total Assets 67.53 47.71 19.83 
  (5.47) (11.00) (12.28) 
Number of observations 27 50 77 
 
 
Panel A compares households in our sample with those in the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) who recently 
bought a house or apartment. Panel B compares the 2 key risk characteristics of each mortgage with those 
reported in the SNB Financial Stability Report 2014, and Panel C compares banks in our sample with the full 
sample of those 50 Swiss banks focused on deposit-taking and lending. We always compare all characteristics 
available both in our sample and in the respective benchmark. Column (1) always shows the mean value in 
our sample and in brackets the standard error. Column (2) shows the respective values for the benchmark 
sample, except for Panel B where none are given. Column (3) computes the difference and the pooled standard 
error to evaluate its statistical significance. 
